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SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OP UTAH 
oooOooo 
VICKIE BURROW, ) 
Plaintiff/Respondent, ) SUPREME COURT NO, 20294 
vs. ) 
MARK VRONTIKIS, ) APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Defendant/Appellant. ) 
oooOooo 
This is an appeal from the decision rendered by the District 
Court of the Third Judicial District for Salt Lake County, State 
of Utahr the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick presiding. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
This case involves the question of whether the right to back 
support within the period of limitation provided by Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 78-45a-3 is subject to the doctrine of 
equitable estoppel* 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The lower court determined that the defendant was the father 
of the plaintiff's child, born the 17th day of August, 1976, The 
Court further determined that the plaintiff should receive child 
support in the amount of Two Hundred Dollars ($200.00) per month, 
running from June of 1983 when Plaintiff filed her Complaint in 
this matter. (See Judgment) This portion of the Courtfs Order 
was not appealed. The Court further, however, provided judgment 
against the defendant in the amount of Seven Thousand Two Hundred 
Dollars ($7,200.00) for back support for the period June, 1979, 
through June, 1983. The trial court looked at the elements of 
the doctrines of latches and estoppel but determined as a matter 
of law that they could not be applied to obligations arising 
under Title 78, Chapter 45a. (Judgment and Findings of Fact). It 
is from this judgment for back support that defendant appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant respectfully submits that the doctrine of 
equitable estoppel is and should be fully applicable to claims 
for back support under Title 78, Chapter 45a of Utah Code 
Annotated, and that the judgment rendered by the District Court 
should be reversed, and the matter remanded to allow the District 
Court to consider application of the doctrine of estoppel against 
such claim. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Judgment was entered by the District Court on the 18th day 
of September, 1984. Defendant filed a timely Notice of Appeal 
which was perfected, and pursuant to stipulation, provided a 
supersedeas bond against the appealed from judgment in the amount 
of Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Plaintiff and defendant dated during the latter part of 
1975 and the early months of 1976. The relationship, although 
meeting the physical requirements for conception, never grew to 
one of emotional commitment* The plaintiff was then eighteen or 
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nineteen and the Defendant a twenty year old. (TRf pg. 34-35) 
2. In approximately March of 1976, the plaintiff discovered 
that she was pregnant and met the defendant to advise him of 
these facts. (TRf pg. 36) 
3. Following that meeting, there was no direct contact 
between the plaintiff and defendant for a period of seven years. 
(TR, pg. 38-39) 
4. Plaintiff determined that she wanted to raise the child 
"separately and independently of Mark Vrontikisn. (TR, pg. 21, 
Ln. 24, pg. 22, Ln. 13) 
5. This decision was made even prior to the plaintifffs 
conversation with the defendant wherein he was advised of her 
pregnancy. (TR, pg. 22-23) 
6. The defendant was subsequently advised of the 
plaintiff's desire not to see him, to have no contact with him, 
and to have him play no role in the life of the child. (TR, pg. 
38-39) 
7. Plaintiff subsequently married Allan Burrow and has had 
two children from that relationship. (TR, pg. 4) No claim for 
support or contact with the defendant was made by the plaintiff 
until January of 1983. That contact resulted in the instant 
matter being filed in June of 1983. 
SUMMARY OP ARGUMENT 
The doctrine of equitable estoppel is properly applicable to 
claims arising under a statute. The doctrine has been applied to 
cases involving past support obligations for a child born in 
wedlock. There is no reason to distinguish between the rights of 
the mother of a child born out of wedlock to recover past 
support, in spite of her wrongdoing, from the rights of the 
mother of a child born in wedlock* The trial court should have 
applied the doctrine of equitable estoppel to the past support 
obligation and reached a resolution based on the facts. 
ARGUMENT 
THE DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL MAY BAR 
A RECOVERY FOR PART OR ALL OF A JUDGMENT 
FOR BACK SUPPORT IN ACTIONS INSTITUTED 
UNDER UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, TITLE 78, 
CHAPTER 45A. 
All parents have a duty to support their children* Utah 
Code Annotated, Section 78-45-3. This duty applies whether the 
child is a product of a solemnized relationship or born out of 
wedlock. Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-45a-l. But with this 
obligation comes parental rights and the opportunity to 
participate in the enjoyment of the child. See Slade £* Dennis* 
594 p.2d 898 (1979), Ttmm^a £*. CMlflren's Mil Society sdL Pgden, 
12 Utah 2d 235, 364 P.2d 1029 (1961). 
In 1981, this Court determined that there was no statute of 
limitations on determinations of paternity. Szarak Y±. Sandoval, 
636 P.2d 1082 (1981). The statutory scheme of the uniform act on 
paternity, however, provides a statute of limitations against 
recovery for back support. On what would appear to be the theory 
that each separate expenditure toward support gives rise to a new 
claim or cause of action for participation by the putative 
father, no claim is allowed for support claims outside a four 
year period preceding the commencement of an action for determin-
ation of paternity. Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-45a-3. 
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It is concern for the needs and interests of the child which 
drive the non-application of statutes of limitations to the 
determinations of paternity. 
"We are unable to find any time limitation as 
to when a suit may be instituted to determine 
paternity* The child has an interest in the 
matter, and courts should be reluctant to in-
vent limitations not set out in the statute, 
especially where minor children may be ad-
versely affected thereby. 
..• In cases of establishing paternity, there 
are other public policy considerations such 
as the need of the minor child for support 
and the requirement that the man who actually 
sired the child be required to furnish itfs 
support. Nielsen &n& th& State Q± Utah &£ 
£ M through £te Utah State Pepartment Ql 
Social Services 3L*. Hansen, 564 p.2d 113, 
(1977) 
To this end/ it has been determined that a parent cannot 
release the right to future support. Price JLL Price, 4 Utah 2d 
153, 289 P.2d 1044, GulleY ^ Gulley, 570 P.2d 127 (1977). It 
has thus been recognized that a right to support is owed by every 
parent to their child. This obligation, however, is for future 
support. Thus, every action which is brought for a determination 
of support obligations, as well as a claim for reimbursement for 
past support, is in fact two separate claims representing the 
interests of at least two separate parties. The Missouri Court 
of Appeals described this as two remedies, one looking to future 
support of the child, the other a common law independent action 
seeking to recover reimbursement for expenses already incurred. 
"The two remedies are conterminous rather than concurrent, and 
the one begins where the other ends." ilmiiJl Zt. SffiUJl, 300 S.W. 
2d 275, 278 (Mo. App. 1957). Missouri has also applied this 
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principal to claims for recovery of past expenditures for the 
support of illegitimate children. 
"We believe the same principal applies 
where a mother seeks future support for her 
illegitimate child as well as recovery for 
past expenditures. The latter action has 
nothing to do with child support; the 
mother alone is entitled to reimbursement 
upon the basis of her quasi contractual re-
lationship with the child1s father." (Cita-
tion omitted). In the child's support 
count in this case, the son is the true 
party in interest and is represented by his 
mother only because of the disability to 
pursue by reason of minority. (Citations 
omitted). In her action for reimbursement, 
the mother is the only interested Plaintiff. 
"If [the judgment is] collected, that money 
goes to her, not to the child, who has al-
ready had the past support." (Citations 
omitted). V*. JLL £*.r 579 S.W. 2d 149, 151-
152 (Mo. App. 1979). 
This Court has recognized this principal with respect to 
past support. 
"However, this [the rights of the child to 
future support] does not mean that a 
mother may not, by her actions or repre-
sentations, or both, preclude herself from 
recovering past due installments of sup-
port money to reimburse her for the money 
which she has spent for the support of the 
child." karson su parson* 5 ut.2d 224. 
300 P.2d 596, 598 (1956); see also Wases-
£M Z,. Wasescha, 548 P.2d 895 (1976) . 
In the instant case, the defendant asserted that plaintifffs 
claim for past support should be barred by the doctrine of 
latches and/or equitable estoppel. The trial court examined the 
evidence against defendant's claim, but determined that he was 
unable to apply this doctrine or provide any relief. "I do not 
condone the plaintiff's conduct in waiting some six years to make 
claim for support in the form of a lump sum obligation. It may 
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well be that had notice been given to the defendant much earlier, 
out of claim for back support, the defendant could have shared 
certain of the expenses incident to the raising of the child and 
thereby reduced the plaintifffs financial hardship* Conversely, 
had that been done, he would not now be faced with the difficult 
problem of a large lump sum obligation with his current family 
obligations and his new child. However, this Court is bound by 
the statutory scheme of the Utah Legislature and acted in the 
Uniform Paternity Act, Title 78-45a and following, as well as the 
language of our Supreme Court in interpreting that act under 
Getto (sic) vs. Butler Case, 584 P.2d 868, wherein it was stated 
that the equitable doctrines of latches and estoppel have no 
relevance in an action of this type since it is based upon a 
statutory schemen (TR, pg. 5, In. 8-25) 
Zito }u Butler. 584 P.2d 868 (1978) is a per curium decision 
of this Court affirming an award of both future support and past 
support for an illegitimate child. The primary attack of the 
appellant who appeared pro se, seems to have rested on a claim of 
Statute of Limitations. This Court, however, includes the 
following two sentences in that decision: 
"Defendant also seeks to invoke the equitable 
doctrines of estoppel and latches. This being 
a statutory action, neither has any applica-
tion." Id. at 869. 
The only support for these sentences is a reference to 27 AmJur 
2d, Equity Sec. 154. That section is fully set forth in the 
attachment hereto, but in pertinent part provides as follows: 
"Latches is an equitable defense, and generally 
it arises only where there has been an unrea-
sonable delay in asserting an equitable remedy. 
Ordinarily the defense may not be invoked in a 
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court of law, the action of the latter court 
being governed by the statute of limitations. 
It is said that only where the elements of an 
estoppel are present, may latches constitute 
a bar in an action at law* (Emphasis added). 
Id. 
The unfortunate two sentences cited above from Zito v. 
Butler and relied upon by the trial court find no support in law 
and are inconsistent with prior rulings of this Court where the 
issues were properly represented on both sides. Even though the 
terms "latches" and "estoppel" are utilized almost 
interchangeably throughout the legal profession, they are 
separate and distinct principals. Leaver v. Grose, 610 P.2d 1262 
(1980) . 
Trad i t i ona l l y , l a tches e x i s t s where two elements are proved: 
"(1) The lack of d i l igence on the pa r t of p l a i n t i f f ; 
(2) An i n j u r y t o d e f e n d a n t owing t o such l a c k of 
d i l i g e n c e . " £.SE£HA]LQ1 AS. 3LL SllS.a£ll£il£.£ £ JlfiEPins ££!Lk££ 
Associates, 535 p.2d 1256, 1260 (1975); Leaver iu Grose, supra at 
1264. 
While the equitable function of latches may well serve the 
same fundamental principals as a statute of limitations, and may 
have questionable application where a statute of limitations has 
been provided or the claim based upon doctrines of law as opposed 
to equity, it is the primary force and function of equitable 
estoppel to attack the ability of a party to rely upon statutory 
protections. In J.P. Koch, Inc. v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc., 534 
P.2d 903 (1975), Koch sued to recover labor and materials 
furnished as a subcontractor on a construction job to the 
defendants, wherein the general contractor had become insolvent. 
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Plaintiff relied upon the statutory bonding requirements to 
impute liability for its claim on the defendants. Defendants 
claimed that plaintiffs were estopped through their actions from 
relying upon the statute. In ruling in favor of the defendants, 
and against the application of the statute, this court stated as 
follows: 
"The position of the plaintiff in support of 
the ruling of the trial court seems to be that 
failure of the owner to furnish the bond re-
quired by Section 14-2-1 results absolute lia-
bility; and that the plaintiff could neither 
waive its right nor be estopped from enforcing 
it* This, of course is not right* Notwith-
standing the provisions of that statute, there 
is no question but that a person may waive or 
forego the right it gives him, the same as he 
could any other property right." Id. at 904. 
Thus equitable doctrine can be applied and statutory schemes are 
not absolute in the face of equity. "It is a doctrine of equity 
to prevent one party from diluting or inducing another into a 
position where he will unjustly suffer loss." Id. at 905. 
It is further well recognized that the doctrine of equitable 
estoppel may be applied specifically against the application of 
the statute of limitations. Rice ^  Granite School District, 456 
P.2d 159 (1969) . 
Additionally, this doctrine is no stranger to claims based 
upon the claims for past support. Larspn 3LL Larson* supra*; 
Kasescha z± wasescha* supra; In JLS Marriage al Sz&mokl, 47 Cal. 
App. 3d 812 (Cal., 1975). 
In the case of Larson su Larson* supra* provides the most 
indepth analysis of this application to obligations for past due 
support. In Larson, the defendant provided no support to the 
minor children of the parties from 1947 to 1955. The defendant 
12 
maintained that his failure to provide support during this period 
was predicated upon representations from the mother of the 
children that "• . . all she wanted from the appellant is that he 
should refrain from trying to see her or the child." Id. at 596. 
In reliance upon representations of the respondent, the appellant 
in the LSLJLS.Q.11 case had remarried and had taken on other 
obligations. As in the instant case, no relationship was 
maintained with the children and the father changed his situation 
from that existing at the time the obligation was incurred. As 
in the instant case, the trial court determined a defense of 
latches or estoppel was not available to the Larson appellant. 
This court determined that estoppel was applicable in such a 
circumstance. The Larson court noted: 
"Where the fatherfs failure to make such pay-
ments was induced by her representations or 
actions, and where, as a result of such repre-
sentations or actions the father has been 
lulled into failing to make such payments and 
into changing his position which he would not 
have done but for such representations, and 
that as a result of such failure to pay and 
change in his conditions, it will cause him 
great hardship and injustice if she is allowed 
to enforce the payment of such back install-
ments, she may be thereby estopped from enforc-
ing the payment of such back installments." Id 
at 598. 
There is no logical basis upon which to predicate a distinction 
between the application of estoppel to a back support obligation 
founded upon a decree of divorce from founded upon the 
determination of paternity. The illegitimate child bears no 
greater interest at law than that of a lawful marriage and in 
fact, as indicated above, has no relationship to the claim made 
by the mother for repayment. The actions of a mother claiming 
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back support founded upon a decree of divorce may be analyzed by 
the trial court for a determination of estoppel. Likewise, the 
trial court in the instant case should have been allowed to apply 
the doctrine in this matter. The unfortunate language of Zito s^ 
Butler", supra should be corrected to correct the confusion 
created thereby and bring its principals into consistency with 
the body of law dealing with the subject of estoppel as 
established and existing within the State of Utah and throughout 
the United States. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the trial court should be reversed and 
remanded as to the judgment in the amount of Seven Thousand Two 
Hundred Dollars ($7,200.00) predicated upon back support and 
remanded to allow application of the doctrine of estoppel. 
DATED this 2^2^ day of March, 1985^^? 
JEROME H. MOONEY 
Attorney for the Appellant 
14 
CERTIFICATE OP MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and exact copy of the 
foregoing Brief, postage fully prepaid, to: 
THOMAS N. ARNETT, JR. 
900 Newhouse Building 
10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Dated this 2~*- aay 0f March, 1 985. 
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THOMAS N. ARNETT, JR. (0128) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
900 Newhouse Building 
10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-5650 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
• VICKIE BURROW, 
\ Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARK VRONTIKIS, 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C83-3916 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
oooOooo 
The above-entitled action came on regularly for trial 
before the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, Judge of the above-
entitled Court, on Monday, the 13th day of August, 1984, at the 
hour of 2:00 p.m., plaintiff appearing in person and through her 
attorney Thomas N. Arnett, Jr., and the defendant appearing in 
person and through his attorney Jerome H. Mooney of the firm of 
Mooney and Smith, and the Court having heard the stipulation of 
the parties by and through their respective counsel as to certain 
issues, having heard the sworn testimony of the plaintiff and 
defendant, having heard the arguments of counsel, having considere 
the contents of the Court's file, and good cause appearing 
therefore, and having heretofore made and entered its Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law; 
-1-
NOW, THEREFORE; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 
1* That the defendant Mark Vrontikis be and is hereby 
declared to be the natural father of Chad Laverne Harney, son of 
the plaintiff, Vickie Burrow. That the birth certificate of Chad 
Laverne Harney shall be amended to that the minor child's name is 
Chad Laverne Vrontikis. 
2. That the plaintiff is awarded the care, custody and 
(control of the minor child Chad Laverne Vrontikis, subject to 
reasonable rights of visitation in the defendant. 
3. That upon the entry of this judgment, the Court's 
file 6hall be sealed and shall not be opened to any perse-* 
without further order of the Court. 
4. That the defendant is ordered to pay to the 
plaintiff child support for the benefit of the minor child of the 
iparties in the sum of $200.00 per month, effective June 1, 1983, 
until the minor child reaches the age of majority. That so long 
as the defendant is current in his payment of child support, the 
defendant shall be entitled to claim the minor child as a 
deduction for income tax purposes. 
5. That the plaintiff is granted judgment against the 
defendant for child support from June 1, 1983 through August 31, 
11984, in the sum of $3,000.00 less a credit in the sum in the sum 
of $250.00 for one-half of the cost of the HLA Tissue Typing 
Test, for a judgment amount of $2,750.00. 
6. That the plaintiff is granted judgment against the 
defendant for child support for the period from June 1, 1979 
through May 31, 1983, in the sum of $7,200.00, representing 
2 
support at a rate of $150.00 per month. 
7. That the defendant is ordered to maintain the minor 
child on the defendant's medical insurance and pay one-half of 
any medical or dental expense incurred on behalf of the minor 
child which is not paid by said insurance. 
8. That the defendant is ordered to obtain and 
maintain $20,000.00 of life insurance on his lifef with the minor 
child of the parties named as beneficiary thereof, until the 
minor child reaches age 18. 
9. That the plaintiff is granted judgment against the 
defendant for her costs of Court incurred herein in the sum of 
$34.75. 
DATED this day of , 1984. 
BY THE COURT: 
District Judge 
Approved as to form: 
3 
THOMAS N. ARNETT, JR. (0128) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
900 Newhouse Building 
10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 36 3-5650 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
VICKIE BURROW, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARK VRONTIKIS, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. C83-3916 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
-oooOooo-
The above-entitled action came on regularly for trial 
before the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, Judge of the above-
entitled Court, on Monday, the 13th day of August, 1984, at the 
hour of 2:00 p.m., plaintiff appearing in person and through her 
attorney Thomas N. Arnett, Jr., and the defendant appearing in 
person and through his attorney Jerome H. Mooney of the firm of 
Mooney and Smith, and the Court having heard the stipulation of 
the parties by and through their respective counsel as to certain 
issues, having heard the sworn testimony of the plaintiff and 
defendant, having heard the arguments of counsel, having considere 
the contents of the Court's file, and good cause appearing 
therfor, now makes and enters the following: 
-1-
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That the defendant, Mark Vrontikis, is the natural , 
father of plaintiff's son, Chad Laverne Harney. That the birth 
certificate of Chad Laverne Harney should be amended so that the 
minor child's name is Chad Laverne Vrontikis. 
2. That the plaintiff should be awarded the care, custody 
i and control of the minor child Chad Laverne Vrontikis, subject to j 
i ! 
! j j reasonable rights of visitation in the defendant. i 
i i 
i i j 3. That upon the entry of judgment in this matter, the I 
j Court's file should be sealed and should not be opened to any j 
j person without further order of the Court. 
4. That the income of the plaintiff and her husband and 
| the income of the defendant and his wife appear to be roughly 
1 
! equivalent, and child support for the minor child should be 
ordered commensurate with the defendant's ability to pay and the j 
child's needs. That the Court finds that the current expenses for 
the minor child are the sum of $436.00, and that each parent 
i should be responsible for approximately one-half (1/2) of the j 
i ' 
J child's expenses and the defendant should therefore be ordered to j 
j pay child support to the plaintiff in the sum of $200.00 per month:, 
I effective June 1, 1983, until the child reaches the age of majority. 
j ! 
i 
J That so long as the defendant is current in his payments of child j 
j support, the defendant shall be entitled to claim the minor child I 
Chad Laverne Vrontikis as a deduction for income tax purposes. 
5, That the provisions of the Utah Uniform Act on 
Paternity, Sections 78-45(a)-1, et seq., Utah Code Annoated 
(1953 as amended) and the case of Zito v. Butler, 584 P2d 868 
(Utah 1978) entitled the plaintiff to recover a lump sum for 
support furnished to the minor child in the four (4) year period 
preceding plaintiff's filing of this action. That the plaintiff's 
i recent increase in monthly living expenses indicates that the 
i 
i support furnished to the minor child in the past was less than at 
I 
I present and the sum of $150.00 per month is a reasonable amount i 
for the minor child's support for the pericd from June 1979 through 
j May 31, 1983, for a total sum of $7,200.00. That the defendant 
I should be entitled to a credit against this amount for one-half 
I 
1
 (1/2) of the cost of the HL-A tissue typing tests. 
I 6. That the defendant should be ordered to maintain the 
l minor child Chad Laverne Vrontikis on the defendant's medical 
I j 
i1 insurance and pay one-half (1/2) of any medical or dental expense 
I incurred on behalf of the minor child which is not paid by said 
l 
i1 insurance. 
i i 
! 7. That the defendant should obtain and maintain j 
I$20,000.00 of life insurance on his life, with the minor child of 
P 
I the parties named as beneficiary thereof, until the minor child > 
j ! t 
I reaches age 18. 
i ; 
j 8. That the defendant should be ordered ^o reimburse the j 
[plaintiff for her costs of Court incurred herein. 
I -3-
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now 
makes and enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS 0£ LAW 
1. This Court is bound by the ruling in Zito y. 
But ler» supra, and may not apply the Doctrine of Latches or 
Estoppel with respect to past support obligations in bastardy 
actions. 
2, That a Judgment should be entered in accordance 
with the foregoing Findings of Fact. 
DATED this day of August, 1984. 
BY THE COURT: 
District Judge 
App*vpv_£d as to form: 
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I'NIFORM ACT ON PATEBNITY 
Section 78-45a-l. 
78-45a-2. 
78-45a-3. 
78-45a-4. 
78-45a-5. 
78-45a-6. 
78-45a-7. 
78-45a-8. 
78-45a-9. 
78-45a-10. 
78-45a-ll. 
78-45a-12. 
78-45a-13. 
78-45a-14. 
78-45a-15. 
78-45a-16. 
78-45a-17. 
Obligations of the father. 
Enforcement. 
Limitation on recovery from the father. 
Limitations on recovery from father's estate. 
Remedies. 
Time of trial. 
Authority for blood tests. 
Selection of experts. 
Compensation of expert witnesses. 
Effect of test results. 
Judgment. 
Security. 
Settlement agreements. 
Venue. 
Uniformity of interpretation. 
Short title. 
Operation of act. 
78-45a-l. Obligations of the father.—The father of a child which is or 
may be born out of wedlock is liable to the same extent as the father of a 
child born in wedlock, whether or not the child is born alive, for the reason-
able expense of the mother's pregnancy and confinement and for the educa-
tion, necessary support and funeral expenses of the child. A child born out 
of wedlock includes a child born to a married woman by a man other 
than her husband. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 1. 
Title of Act. 
An act relating to paternity; providing 
for the enforcement of duties thereof and 
making uniform the law with respect to 
paternity.—L. 1965, ch. 158. 
Comparable Provisions. 
States that have adopted the Uniform 
Act on Paternity include: Kentucky, 
Maine, Mississippi, Montana, and New 
Hampshire. 
Cross-Eeferences. 
Bastardy Act, 77-60-1 et seq. 
Injunction not to issue against order of 
department or action of county attorney 
or attorney general, 78-45b-19. 
Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act, 
78-45-1 et seq. 
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of 
Support Act, 77-61a-l et seq. 
Bastardy Act. 
This act does not repeal the Bastardy 
Act, chapter CO of Title 77, or any part 
thereof. State v. Judd, 27 U. (2d) 79, 493 
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P. 2d 604; State v. Abram, 27 U. (2d) 
266, 495 P. 2d 313. 
Custody Rights. 
Father who publicly acknowledged his 
paternity had right to custody of his il-
legitimate child, second only to mother's 
right, so that it was improper for juvenile 
court to dismiss petition for custody and 
thereby terminate father's parental right 
without hearing to determine whether he 
was fit and proper person. State in Inter-
est of Baby Girl M, 25 U. (2d) 101, 476 
P. 2d 1013, 45 A. L. R. 3d 206. 
Plaintiff's election of remedies. 
Bastardy cases are tried as civil matters 
rather than criminal even though the cases 
are brought in the name of the state, and 
the plaintiff mother must elect whether to 
proceed under the Bastardy Act or the 
Uniform Act on Paternity since her cause 
of action cannot be filed under both 
statutes. Brown v. Marrelli, 527 P. 2d 230. 
Collateral References. 
Bastards€=>16. 
10 C.J.S. Bastards § 18. 
10 Am. Jur. 2d 895, Bastards § 68. 
Foreign filiation or support o rier in baa-
tarcy proceedings, requiring periodic pay-
ments, as extraterritorially enforceable, 16 
A. L. R. 2d 1098. 
Provision in divorce decree against 
mother's husband, not the father of her 
illegitimate child, for its support, 90 A. L. 
R. 2d 583. 
Validity and construction of putative 
father's promise to Bupport or provide for 
illegitimate child, 20 A. L. R. 3d 500. 
78-45a-2. Enforcement.—Paternity may be determined upon the peti-
tion of the mother, child, or the public authority chargeable by law with 
the support of the child. If paternity has been determined or has been 
acknowledged according to the laws of this state, the liabilities of the 
father may be enforced in the same or other proceedings (1) by the mother, 
child, or the public authority which have furnished or may furnish the 
reasonable expenses of pregnancy, confinement, education, necessary sup-
port, or funeral expenses, and (2) by other persons including private 
agencies to the extent that they have furnished the reasonable expenses of 
pregnancy, confinement, education, I ^cessary support, or funeral expenses. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 2. 
Cross-Reference. 
Enforcement of provisions by depart-
ment of social services, 55-15a-24. 
CoUateral References. 
BastardsC=>19 et seq. 
10 C.J S Bastards § 32 et seq. 
10 Am. Jur. 2d 900 et seq., Bastards § 74 
et seq. 
Death of putative father as precluding 
nction for determination of paternity or 
for child support, 58 A. L. R. 3d 188.* 
Effect of death of child prior to institu-
tion of bastardy proceedings bv mother, 
7 A. L. R. 2d 1397. 
Maintainability of bastardy proceedings 
against infant defendant without appoint-
ment of guardian ad litem, 69 A. L. R. 2d 
1379. 
Maintainability of bastardy proceedings 
by infant prosecutrix in her own name and 
right, 50 A. L. R. 2d 1029. 
Marriage of woman to one other than 
defendant as affecting her right to insti-
tute or maintain bastardv proceeding, 9S 
A. L. R. 2d 256. 
Nonresident mother's right to maintain 
bastardy proceedings, 57 A. L. R. 2d 6S9. 
Right of mentally incompetent mother 
to institute bastardv proceeding, 71 A. L. 
R. 2d 1261. 
Statute of limitations in illegitimacy or 
bastardy proceedings, 59 A. L. R. 3d 685. 
Tempoiary allowance for support or 
costs pending action or proceeding for 
declaration of paternitv of an illegitimate 
child, 136 A. L. R. 1264. 
What amounts to recognition within 
statutes affecting the status or rights of 
illegitimates, 33 A. L. R. 2d 705. 
78-45a-3. Limitation on recovery from the father.—The father's liabili-
ties for past education and necessary support are limited to a period of 
four years next preceding the commencement of an action. 
519 
78-45a-4 JUDICIAL CODE 
History: L. 19S5, ch. 168, § 3. 10 C.J.S. Bastards § 53. 
10 Am. Jur. 2d 936, Bastards § 127. 
Collateral References. 
BastardsC=>34. 
78-45&-4. Limitations on recovery from father's estate.—The obligal 
of the estate of the father for liabilities under this act are limited 
amounts accrued prior to his death and such sums as may be payable 
dependency under other laws. 
History: L. 1^65, ch. 158, § 4. 10 C.J.S. Bastards § 53. 
_ , 10 Am. Jur. 2d 936, Bastards § 127. 
CoUateral References. 
BastardsC=>34. 
78-45a-5. Remedies.—(1) The district court has jurisdiction of 
action under this act and all remedies for the enforcement of judgmen 
for expenses of pregnancy and confinement for a wife or for educatio 
necessary support, or funeral expenses for legitimate children apply. Tl 
court has continuing jurisdiction to modif}* or revoke a judgment f< 
future education and necessary support. All remedies under the Unifori 
Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, are available for enforcement c 
duties of support under this act. 
(2) The otligee may enforce his right of support against the obligo 
and the state department of social services may proceed on behalf of th 
obligee ui m its own behalf pursuant to the provisions of chapter 45b ol 
this title to enforce that right of support against the obligor. In sucl 
actions by the department, all the provisions of chapter 45b of this title 
shall be equally applicable to this chapter. Whenever a court action is 
commenced by the state department of social services, it shall be the duty 
of the attorney general or the county attorney, of the county of residence 
of the obligee, to represent that department. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, §5; 1975, ch. Cross-Reference. 
96, § 24. Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of 
Compiler's Notes. S l lI ,l>0 , , A r t ' " 6 1 a 1 e t sc<*' 
The 1975 amendment designated the Collateral References. 
former section as subsec. (1); added sub- Ba^.ud<:C=>80 et sen. 
FCC (2); and made minor changes in 10 CJ.S Bastards §§116, 117. 
pi 'aseo)og> m subsec. (]) .
 1 0 Am Jur. 2d 935 et seq, Bastards 
§ 126 ct s(q. 
78-45a-6. Time of trial.—If the issue of paternity is raised in action 
commenced during the pregnancy of the mother, the trial shall not, without 
the consent of the alleged father, he held until after the birth or mis-
carriage but during such delay testimony may be perpetrated according to 
the laws of this state. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 15-, § 6, 10 C.J.R Bastards § 101. 
^ „ , ^ , 10 Am. Jur. 2d 932,' Bastards 8 123. 
Collateral References. 
BaBtards'J=>67. 
78-45a-7. Authority for blood tests.—The court, upon its own initiative 
or upon suggestion made by or on behalf of any person whose blood is in-
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volved may, or upon motion of any party to the action made at a time so 
as not to delay the proceedings unduly, shall order the mother, child and 
alleged father to submit to blood tests. If any party refuses to submit to 
such tests, the court may resolve the question of paternity against such 
party or enforce its order if the rights of others and the interests of justice 
so require. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 7. 10 C.J.S. Bastards § 93. 
10 Am. Jur. 2d 928, Bastards § 118. 
Cross-Reference. 
Blood tests to determine parentage, 78- Weight and sufficiency of blood grouping 
25-18 to 78-25-23. test to Bhow paternity or legitimacy, 46 A. 
L. R. 2d 1027. Collateral References. 
Bastards065. 
78-45a-8. Selection of experts.—The tests shall he made by experts 
qualified as examiners of blood types who shall be appointed by the court. 
The experts shall be called by the court as witnesses to testify to their 
findings and shall be subject to cross-examination by the parties. Any par ty 
or perse , at whose suggestion the tests have been ordered may demand tha t 
other experts, qualified as examiners of blood types, perform independent 
tests under order of court, the results of which may be offered in evidence. 
The number and qualifications of such experts shall be determined by the 
court. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 8. Cross-Reference. 
Blood test examiner as witness, 78-25-20. 
78-45a-9. Compensation of expert witnesses.—The compensation of each 
expert witness appointed by the court shall be fixed at a reasonable amount. 
It shall be paid as the court shall order. The court may order that it be 
paid by the parties in such proportions and at such times as it shall pre-
scribe. The fee of an expert witness called by a party but not appointed 
by the court shall be paid by the party calling him but shall not be taxed 
as costs in the action. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 9. CoUateral References. 
BastardsC=>94. 
10 C.J.S. Bastards § 138. 
78-45a-10. Effect of test results.—If the court finds that the conclusions 
of all experts, as disclosed by the evidence based upon the tests, arc that 
the alleged father is not the father of the child, the question of paternity 
shall be resolved accordingly. If the experts disagree in their findings or 
conclusions, the question shall be submitted upon all the evidence. If the 
experts conclude that the blood tests show the possibility of the alleged 
father's paternity, admission of this evidence is within the discretion of the 
court, depending upon the infrequency of the blood type. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 10. Cross-Reference. 
Admissibility of blood test results, 78-
2r» 21. 
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Collateral References. Eight to jury trial in bastardy proceed-
Bastard*S=>65. ™Z*> ** A- ^ B- 2 d 1 1 2 8-
10 C J . 8 . Bastards § 93. 
10 Am. Jur. 2d 922, Bastards § 107. 
78-45a-ll. Judgment.—Judgments under this act may be for periodic 
payments which may vary in amount. The court may order payments to be 
made to the mother or to some person, corporation, or agency designated to 
administer them under the supervision of the court. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 11. Judgment in bastardy proceeding at 
conclusive of issues ir. subsequent baa-
Collateral References. tardy proceeding, 37 A. L. E. 2d 836. 
Ba8tards@=>78. Bight of mother of illegitimate child to 
10 C.J.8. Bastards § 111. appeal from order or judgment entered in 
10 Am. Jur. 2d 936, Bastards § 127. bastardy proceedings, 18 A. L. K. 2d 948. 
78-45a-12. Security.—The court may require the alleged father to give 
bond or other security for the payment of the judgment. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 12. 10 C.J.8. Bastards § 118 et ieq. 
10 Am. Jur. 2d 936, Bastards § 128. 
CoUateTal Eeferences. 
Bastards^=84 et se^. 
78-45a-13. Settlement agreements.—An agreement of settlement with 
the alleged father is binding only when approved by the court. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 13. Avoidance of lump-sum settlement or 
release of bastardy claim on grounds of 
CoUateral References. fraud> mistake, or duress, 84 A. L. B. 2d 
BastardsC=>26. 593. 
10 C.J.S. Bastards § 40 et seq. Lump-sura compromise and settlement, 
30 Am. Jur. 2d 917 et seq., Bastards §98 or release, of bastardy cla m or of bas-
et seq. tardy or paternity proceedings, 84 A. L. 
R. 2d 524. 
78-45a-14. Venue.—An action under this act may be brought in the 
county where the alleged father is present or has property or in the county 
where the mother resides. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 14. 10 C.J.S. Bastards §§ 57, 58. 
10 Am. Jur. 2d 902, Bastards § 76. Collateral References. 
Bastards036. 
78-45a-15. Uniformity of interpretation.—This act shall be so inter-
preted and construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform 
the law of those states which enact it. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 15. 
78-45a-16. Short title.—This act shall be known and may be cited as 
the "Uniform Act on Paternity." 
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 16. 
78-45a-17. Operation of act.—This act applies to all cases of birth out of 
wedlock as defined in this act where birth occurs after this act takes effect. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 17. 
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